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ABSTRACT
Drawing on data from the International Social Survey Programme 2002 survey 
‘Family and changing gender roles’, this article looks at the diversity in attitudes 
towards gender relations and family values in contemporary Europe from a gender 
perspective. Rather than the idea of a one-dimensional move from tradition to moder-
nity that would gradually erase the attitudinal gender gap, the findings corroborate 
that gender differentiation plays a key role in attitudinal patterns. Furthermore, 
the attitudinal gender gap is path-specific and varies according to country-specific 
societal modernisation. Hence, I examine differences in the statements of men and 
women to portray attitudinal gender gaps on the national level. I follow the idea that 
wide gender gaps are associated either with women’s financial autonomy or with 
greater societal equality in education and political participation, since they allow for 
greater female awareness of masculine domination. I also argue that family deinsti-
tutionalisation also correlates with greater attitudinal gender gaps.
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INTRODUCTION
In contemporary societies the erosion of the traditional gender order, fostered 
by the decline of patriarchal authority, the growing empowerment of women 
and the increased legitimacy of gender equality, is reflected in both legal and 
institutional changes, in practices and attitudes of social actors, and in fam-
ily systems (e.g. Therborn 2003). A major consequence of this shift has been 
the erosion of the ‘male breadwinner model’, in which men were assumed to 
provide for the family while women took the major responsibility for house-
work and childcare (Lewis 1993; 2001; Crompton 2006).1 However, although 
women’s involvement in public life has increased, there is little doubt – even 
in institutionally equality-oriented settings – that the feminine conquest of 
the public sphere has not been matched by the equality of opportunities 
and rewards or by men’s domestic involvement, even if these have steadily 
increased (Nock 1998; Perista 2002; Torres et al 2004). Moreover, gender dif-
ferences remain important in employment and other social domains.2
Today attitudes have been shown to be more favourable to gender equality 
than in the past, although egalitarian ideals remain unevenly distributed across and 
within societies (Inglehart and Norris 2003; Treas and Widmer 2000; Wall 2007; 
Torres and Brites 2005). Rather than an ideological consensus, men and women 
often express different beliefs concerning the ideal gender roles. Alongside age 
or education, several studies have shown that gender inequalities are somehow 
translated into values and attitudes (e.g. Scott et al 1996; Baxter and Kane 1995).
The existence of gender differences in attitudes towards equality in the 
division of labour and family life is not, however, a consensual assumption. 
Some studies argue for precisely the opposite while pointing to the low rele-
vance of gender in interpreting ideological accounts (Hayes et al 2000; Arts and 
Halman 2004; Georgas et al 2004; Vandecasteele and Billiet 2004). However, 
several findings point to the resilience of attitudinal gender gaps. According 
to Inglehart and Norris (2003: 175), within post-industrial societies the con-
temporary gender gap not only reflects differences in the value orientations of 
men and women, but also points to the greater liberalism of younger women. 
Women in the ‘older’ gender order were more conservative than men, while 
in the ‘modern’ gender order women were more liberal. From this perspec-
tive, rather than generating consensus towards egalitarian ideals, women’s 
achievements in personal independence – through education, paid work and 
welfare state support – would change the gender gap in attitudes.
In this article, I examine the gender gap in attitudes towards gender rela-
tions in family life, to discover whether across Europe women are indeed more 
liberal than men. I propose that, along with other major social determinants 
(such as age, education and religion), gender plays a key role in shaping an 
individual’s attitudes. I anticipate that the attitudinal gender gap will be path-
specific: that is, that it will assume different intensities and configurations in 
different countries. A total of 15 countries were chosen in order to cover dif-
ferent types of societal and gendered modernisation in contemporary Europe: 
from northern and protestant Europe to southern and Catholic Europe and 
from older democracies to post-communist societies.3
REASSESSING THE ATTITUDINAL GENDER GAP
As far as attitudes to gender roles and family values are concerned, several 
studies attribute the gender gap to the greater liberalism of women. 
Scott et al (1996) conducted a cross-national analysis of attitudes towards 
 1. In the 25 members 
states of the European 
Union (EU25) women’s 
employment rates, which 
have been rising since 
the 1950s, stood at 
56.3 per cent in 2005. 
Furthermore, 45 per cent 
of younger-generation 
couples (aged 20–49) 
were full time dual 
earners.
 2. The employment rate 
for men in the EU25 is 
higher (71.2 per cent 
in 2005), more women 
are unemployed than 
men (9.6 per cent 
compared to 7.6 per 
cent in 2006), part-time 
work is highly feminised 
(33 per cent of women 
were working part time 
compared to seven per 
cent of men in 2005), 
and the gender pay gap 
in 2004 was still 15 per 
cent.
 3. I compare the following 
European countries: 
Germany (West and 
East), the United 
Kingdom (Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland), 
the Republic of Ireland, 
the Netherlands, 
Switzerland, Sweden, 
Finland, Norway, 
France, Spain, Portugal, 
the Czech Republic, 
Poland, Hungary and 
Slovakia. To respect 
intra-national specificities, 
I analysed Great 
Britain and Northern 
Ireland separately and, 
similarly, East and West 
Germany.
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marriage and the family in Britain, the United States, West Germany and 
Ireland, and found greater contrasts between men and women than across 
countries. More importantly, the authors suggest that the shift to more lib-
eral views of gender relations accompanies the growth of gender differences 
in some significant areas, such as the idea that women working outside the 
home can be harmful to children, which is still more popular among men. In 
general, in advanced modern societies, and when compared to women, men 
are less supportive of equal roles (Panatoya and Brayfield 1997). They have 
been slower to change their values, even though recent findings have docu-
mented men’s generational change (Thornton 1989), as in Ciabattari’s (2001) 
research in the United States.
A major argument in interpreting these trends concerns a common fact: 
the rise of women’s social and financial independence. The more independ-
ent women become, the more they disengage themselves from the dominant 
masculine gender system, and, consequently, the more their attitudes differ 
from men’s (e.g. Baxter and Kane 1995; Pratto et al 1997): traditionally women 
tend to be less liberal regarding post-material values and political opinions 
(Jelen et al 1994; Inglehart and Norris 2003). Inglehart (1977) emphasises that 
despite the modest impact of gender upon values women were less likely to 
cherish self-expression values – except in the United States and Scandinavia, 
where they had already achieved greater financial independence. Hayes et 
al (2000) replicated similar trends in their study, except where women had 
feminist attitudes and were therefore more independence-minded. More 
recently, using the gender-related development index (GDI) to rank differ-
ent country clusters, Inglehart and Norris (2003) correlated the greater lib-
eralism of women with the level of gender fairness achieved in societies, 
which resulted in a strong generational change among women living in post-
industrial settings.4
At present, the classical developmental perspective focusing on economic 
development is being replaced by a cultural approach that emphasises the 
conversion of economic growth into a process that promotes an emancipa-
tory world-view. The core thesis of the ‘rising tide’ contained in Inglehart and 
Norris (2003) is that the impact of human development is mediated by reli-
gious, historical and institutional legacies in each society. The consequences 
of modernity become more intricate, but attitudes to gender roles continue to 
develop within major cultural differentiations, corresponding to shifts from 
traditional to secular-rational values (associated with the shift from agrar-
ian to industrial forms of society), and from survival to self-expression values 
(which are related to the rise of gender equality and therefore to the change 
into post-industrial societies).
The linkage between self-expression values and the expansion of gender 
equality is in fact a vastly theorised idea. The movement towards a deinstitution-
alised family (Giddens 1993) has been associated with processes of individuali-
sation, which have low compatibility with traditional gender roles. Advocating 
for equality would then result from receptiveness to new lifestyles, promoting 
new forms of social organisation and increased liberalism regarding the family 
and sexual morality (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2002). As a group changing at a 
rapid pace, women would more vigorously defend egalitarian values.
At the meso-level, attitudes towards gender equality have also been 
shown to depend on advances related to welfare states, labour markets and 
family organisation.5 Therefore, considering that paid work constitutes a 
key feature of women’s independence, researchers often see women’s entry 
 4. The GDI is an indication 
of the standard of 
living in a country, 
developed by the United 
Nations. It aims to show 
gender inequalities in 
life expectancy and 
education.
 5. Individual autonomy 
is granted by the state 
and public policies 
directed at supporting 
individual choice, and 
not the family as an 
institution. This is the 
side of individualisation 
that Esping-Andersen 
(1999) refers to as a 
‘defamilialisation’. 
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into the labour force as generating attitudes that are more egalitarian, espe-
cially among women (Oppenheimer 1982; Forsberg et al 2000; Korpi 2000). 
However, although women’s work has a transforming effect on family life, 
its connection with social values has to be re-examined in the light of recent 
findings. As Panatoya and Brayfield (1997) have argued, among the highly 
employed women of Hungary, this appeared not to be an important causal 
relationship, which to a certain extent runs counter to Baxter and Kane’s (1995) 
findings that support the idea the gender gap should be smaller in societies 
in which women are more dependent on men. Hungarian women work more 
than women in the United States, but are also more conservative. A simi-
lar trend seems to apply in Portugal and Finland (Aboim 2007), where more 
than half of the women between 15 and 65 have full-time jobs, but favourable 
attitudes to women’s professional independence seem weaker than in actual 
practice. Full-time paid work seems to have a negative effect on conceptions 
of motherhood and employment, similar to Panatoya’s and Brayfield’s find-
ings on the impact of long working hours on Hungarian women’s values.
Several causes may lie behind the unexpected association between values 
and women’s employment. One of the main hypotheses suggests that the 
impact of employment depends on state family policies. In Europe, while the 
dual breadwinner model has been promoted by the state in the Scandinavian 
countries and even in France and Portugal, mother-oriented policies have been 
popular in West Germany, while private responsibility has burdened women 
with childcare in the United Kingdom (Wall 2008). Comparatively, in some 
countries the man’s role as the breadwinner has undergone fewer changes and 
masculinity has remained more unchallenged depending on the historical path-
ways of the male breadwinner model (Lewis 2001; Pfau-Effinger 2004). A major 
transformation propelled by modernity – concluded by Pfau-Effinger through 
a socio-historical comparison of Finland, Germany and the Netherlands – was 
related to the social strength of the urban bourgeoisie that was a determinant 
for the cultural consolidation of the housewife/male breadwinner contract that 
endured until the 1950s and changed rapidly from the 1960s onwards. Pfau-
Effinger (1999: 62–3) identifies five cultural models in Western Europe. The 
first is the family economic gender model, which is based on the cooperation 
of women and men in family businesses. The second is the male  breadwinner/
female home carer model in which men and women have differentiated roles. 
The third is the male breadwinner/female part-time carer model that is a mod-
ernised version of the previous model. The fourth is the dual breadwinner/
state carer model in which both men and women are employed full time and 
 delegate to the state. Finally, there is the dual breadwinner/dual carer model 
that reflects an equal gender division of public and private responsibilities.
These models delineate specific gender contracts, or gender arrangements, 
that even today are unequally distributed across Western Europe. For instance, 
the family economic gender model, which was traditionally important in Finland, 
still characterises several parts of Greece, Italy and Spain, as well as Portugal. In 
fact, it is argued that cultural models have an independent effect in explaining 
societal differences (which include those of gender) where institutional or eco-
nomic factors are unable to provide a sufficient explanation. Institutional and 
individual actors operate in these cultural frameworks, which they can simul-
taneously defy and change, as seems to be the case with women in (some) 
contemporary Western societies (Duncan and Pfau-Effinger 2000). Therefore, 
gender contracts are always undergoing transformation due to  economic 
change, state and welfare developments or individual action (Crompton 2001). 
PJSS_9.1_art_Aboim_033-058.indd   36 6/9/10   10:44:13 AM
Family and gender values in contemporary Europe
37
The modernisation paths of gender arrangements must therefore bring cultural 
models into the analysis if one wants to understand why there are such dif-
ferential developments in women’s participation in the labour force and the 
organisation of family life. Within the growing dual breadwinner contract, Pfau-
Effinger identifies three cultural models. The first is the dual breadwinner/state 
carer model, common in Sweden and in other Scandinavian countries such as 
Finland, which switched from a family economic model due to the strong role 
of welfare state policies. Here childcare is primarily thought of as a responsibil-
ity of the welfare state, rather than of the family. The second is the dual bread-
winner/dual carer model that is replacing the traditional male breadwinner 
model in Germany and the Netherlands. In this model, childcare is mainly a 
family responsibility that should be organised around a fair distribution of paid 
and unpaid work between men and women with the help of a family wage or 
a state transfer system. The third is the dual breadwinner/‘marketised’ female 
care-giver model whereby (as in the United States and the United Kingdom) 
the family is responsible for organising and paying for childcare in the market-
place. These different cultural models for the gender contract underpin welfare 
policies concerning gender, as well as the real practices of individuals and their 
attitudes towards the ideal family or gender roles.
However, from an individual standpoint, which factors contribute the most 
to explain different and gendered attitudes to gender roles? Why do women 
and men diverge in their attitudes towards family life and the gender division of 
labour? The persistence of diversity across and within societies has been attrib-
uted to the impact of different factors – social, cultural, religious, labour market 
constraints, public policies (lack of childcare services, for example), modernisa-
tion and social gender achievement, etc. However, explanations of this diversity 
are far from being consensual, often reflecting different sociological conceptions 
of individual action. Sometimes modernisation and individualisation are seen 
as promoting a weakening of the structural constraints and allowing action to 
become driven by preferences (Hakim 2003). From the perspective of this author, 
post-industrial societies free individuals from the burden of social and gender 
inequalities. From this rational-choice point of view, women and men would 
simply have different preferences regarding family and labour. An opposing view 
seeks to interpret individual differences concerning gender ideals as part of a sys-
tem of social inequalities in which gender plays a key part, as a principle of power 
and identity (e.g. Connell 1996; Bourdieu 1998). Ideologies and attitudes of indi-
vidual men and women would then reflect the particular premises of an unequal 
gender order (both cultural and interactional), which interweaves macro-social 
developments with particular gender systems (such as the family) and individual 
agency. This second perspective, which explores the linkages between macro-
structural constraints and gender ideologies, is also my standpoint in this paper.
Therefore, concerning my main hypothesis of a cross-country attitudinal 
gender gap, I anticipate that the more liberal attitude of women towards gen-
der and family values will be a common trend across Europe. Even if the find-
ings show country-specific patterns, I propose that gender remains important 
for interpreting normative accounts of family and gender relations. However, I 
suggest a second hypothesis, that of path-specific attitudinal gender gaps that 
may vary according to country profiles, being thus linked to particular gender 
orders coexisting in contemporary Europe (Pfau-Effinger 2004). At the country 
level, I examine the extent to which these profiles depend on  country-specific 
societal modernisation. Instead of using aggregated indexes (such as the 
GDI), I correlate attitudes to a panoply of indicators concerning different 
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 6. To respect intra-
national specificities we 
analysed Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland 
separately, as we did 
with western and eastern 
Germany.
dimensions of gender achievement in education, income and the political par-
ticipation of women, as well as those related to the deinstitutionalisation of 
family life. First, I follow the idea that the largest gender gaps are likely to 
be associated with the social empowerment of women, whether related to 
financial independence or to political participation, since it allows for a greater 
awareness of masculine domination (Baxter and Kane 1995). Second, follow-
ing the theoretical link between individualisation and gender equality, I also 
expect that more deinstitutionalised forms of family organisation (expressed 
in higher divorce rates and a greater number of cohabiting couples) will be 
associated with more negative attitudes towards the male breadwinner ideal, 
thereby promoting larger normative gaps between men and women.
The article is divided into three sections. First, I determine the ‘overall’ 
dimensions of gender and family attitudes through an exploratory factor anal-
ysis and show construct equivalence across the 15 European countries selected 
from the International Social Survey Programme’s (ISSP) family and gender 
relations module carried out in 2002 (ISSP 2002). Second, I cross-analyse the 
countries to identify national as well as gender differences and examine the 
impact of gender alongside education and age, political positioning and reli-
gious attendance, work-life factors – such as the number of weekly working 
hours and the level of work/family stress – and family life factors – such as 
marital status and household composition. Finally, I examine gender gap pat-
terns in order to identify country-specific differentiations.
DATA AND MEASURES
The 2002 ISSP survey sought answers on a large number of topics related to 
family organisation, the gender division of labour and sexual and family moral-
ity, among other issues. The survey took place in 34 countries between 2001 
and 2003. National probability samples were used in 13 of the 15 European 
countries analysed here (Germany [West and East], the United Kingdom 
[Great Britain and Northern Ireland], the Republic of Ireland, Switzerland, 
Sweden, Finland, Norway, France, Spain, Portugal, the Czech Republic, 
Poland and Hungary), while quota proceedings were used in Slovakia and 
the Netherlands (Klein and Harkness 2004).6 My 15-country dataset includes 
responses from 21,952 people: 10,435 men and 11,520 women.
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: ATTITUDINAL DIMENSIONS
To develop an analytical strategy that may help to identify different attitudi-
nal patterns, I selected items with a connection to attitudes towards the rela-
tion between women’s employment and motherhood, the woman’s social role 
(from the homemaker to the independent professional), the man’s participa-
tion in housework and parenting and the marital division of paid work. Beliefs 
and expectations related to the management of family and work, the primary 
social role of women and men and the social construction of motherhood are 
fundamental for understanding attitudes to gender and family life. With respect 
to family organisation and morality, some key indicators helped to assess the 
degree of conservatism or liberalism, or, in other words, of individualisation 
and self-expression. Here I am referring to the acceptance of divorce and 
cohabitation and to the link between parenthood and marriage (Table 1).
The data analyses were carried out on the 12 attitudinal items included in 
Table 1, all of which are ordinal variables on the same measurement scale (the five 
point Likert scale) ranging from one (strongly agree) to five (strongly disagree). 
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The direction of some of the variables was changed so that all had the same social 
meaning, on a scale ranging from one (traditional/conservative attitudes) to five 
(modern/liberal attitudes). I expected that analyses based on the pooled data set of 
21,952 people would reveal four dimensions: one related to the division of labour, 
one to motherhood issues, one to men’s participation in private tasks and one to 
the deinstitutionalisation of family life. However, although principal components 
M
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A pre-school child is likely to suffer if the mother has 
a full-time job
0.690
A job is all right, but what most women want is a home 
and children
0.747
A man’s job is to earn money; a woman’s job is to look 
after the home and family
0.767
People who have never had children lead empty lives 0.589
Men ought to do a larger share of household work than 
they do now
0.897
Men ought to do a larger share of childcare than they do now 0.904
People who want to have children should marry −0.630
A lone father or mother can raise a child as well as 
both of them together 
0.578
It’s okay if two people live together without marrying 0.738
Divorce is the best solution for a couple who can’t work 
out their problems 
0.565
The best way for a woman to be independent is through 
having a job
0.763
Both the husband and the wife should contribute to 
family income
0.749
% of variance explained 19.18 14.06 13.85 11.66
α= 0.70 0.82 0.54 0.46
Table 1: Principal component analysis on items related to attitudes to family and gender roles in 15 European 
countries.
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analysis and varimax rotations resulted in four factors, only two revealed statistical 
internal congruence, with the Cronbach’s alpha values for the other two being 
quite low. Thus, I obtained two factors with loadings greater than 0.60: the one we 
called the motherhood factor (α=0.70), which reveals the tension between wom-
en’s employment, the negative impact it has on children and the image of women 
as traditional homemakers; and a second, the ‘caring man’ factor (α=0.82) that 
aggregates items related to men’s participation in household tasks and childcare.
However, this overall factor structure does not imply that each of the 
15 countries has identical structures. The methodology of testing for con-
struct equivalence across countries requires comparisons of the factor struc-
ture of each country with the overall structure in order to determine the 
factorial agreement of national factor structures with the overall factor solu-
tion. Tucker’s phi was employed as the coefficient of agreement to estimate 
factor equivalence. Principal component analyses with varimax rotation 
were then carried out for each of the countries in my data set, but only in 13 
of the countries was congruence revealed (Tucker’s phi > 0.95). Therefore, it can 
be stated that factors one and two were equivalent across western Germany, 
Great Britain, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Poland, France, Switzerland, 
Spain, Portugal, Finland, Hungary and Slovakia. The reasons for excluding the 
other countries were related to factor structures resulting in five factors (eastern 
Germany and the Republic of Ireland) and to lack of factor agreement (Tucker’s 
phi < 0.90) (the Czech Republic and Northern Ireland). I carried out the same 
procedures to measure the comparability of men and women with the overall fac-
tor structure, and for both groups the Tucker’s phi coefficients were above 0.95.
The final sample included very different gender arrangements, ranging from 
a strong dual breadwinner culture in Scandinavia (Sweden, Norway and Finland) 
to a still strong male breadwinner contract in some of the southern European 
countries. Portugal, where levels of women’s employment are significantly 
higher and state support for a dual earner/dual carer model is on the political 
agenda, constitutes an exception to this pattern (Wall 2008). Western Germany 
and Switzerland fall broadly into the movement of transition between traditional 
male breadwinner and the one-and-a-half earner model, which is strongly based 
on women’s part-time employment (Pfau-Effinger 1999). Great Britain (i.e., 
England, Scotland and Wales) is also included in the cluster that Lewis (2001) 
identifies as consisting of strong breadwinner models, although there is a ris-
ing culture favourable to women’s employment. In contrast, France, which has a 
tradition of full-time working women, tending towards the adult worker model, 
shows an increase in women’s part-time work during the 1990s. Lewis (1998) 
has described France as a modified male breadwinner state in which women 
have benefited from the care and support directed at children. Finally, I also ana-
lyse three post-socialist countries (Poland, Hungary and Slovakia).
For cross-national and intra-national analysis, I considered factor one and 
factor two (Table 1) and constructed two indexes that summarise men’s and 
women’s statements, on a scale ranging from one (conservative) to five (liberal).
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
The independent variables constructed for analyses at the individual level 
reflect my concern over assessing different dimensions of gender relations, 
and may be grouped into four broad categories. The first category is those 
variables addressing social coordinates of inequality (such as age, education 
and my main variable, gender). The second category is family organisation 
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 7. See Appendix 1 for the 
description of the codes 
of these variables.
 8. See Appendix 2.
(e.g. marital status and the presence of children in the household). The third 
is those variables related to work (current employment, weekly hours of paid 
work) and family-work stress (difficulty in concentrating at work or fulfilling 
family responsibilities). Finally, there are those variables that relate to ideo-
logical positioning (church attendance and political positioning).7
Other sets of variables were tested at the country level. Variables were 
intended to reflect cross-national differences in education, employment and 
income, as well as in the political participation of women, thus portraying spe-
cific forms of women’s empowerment.8 I also report data on divorce, cohabita-
tion and types of households in Europe. Using these variables simultaneously, 
I was able to examine several dimensions of gender inequalities, with an eye 
towards assessing the extent to which they may produce national differences 
in attitudes and nation-specific gender gaps.
ANALYTICAL STRATEGY
The analysis proceeds as follows. First, I examine national and gender varia-
tions concerning the motherhood and caring man indexes. Bivariate analysis 
allows an observation of cross-national differences, comparing their statistical 
significance with the overall gender variance, and an examination of the cross-
national variance of the feminine and masculine groups in order to account 
for gender differences in intra-group diversity. Second, I estimate the impact 
of gender alongside other social and demographic coordinates by carrying out 
regression analysis within countries. Third, I analyse the gender gap at the 
country level. With a pooled dataset of 13 countries, I proceed to a hierarchical 
cluster analysis of average scores on the two indexes and the average country 
difference between men and women. I then use non-parametrical Spearman 
correlation to test the effect of the countries’ societal measures of women’s 
empowerment and family deinstitutionalisation.
ATTITUDINAL DIFFERENCES ACROSS CONTEMPORARY 
EUROPE
The cross-European variation is statistically significant on both dimensions. 
Overall scores for the 13 countries reveal a steady modernisation trend among 
Europeans, who position themselves above the middle scale values and are partic-
ularly in favour of men’s participation in household tasks and childcare (Figure 1). 
The contemporary portrait of Europe demonstrates the popularity of ideals 
involving a caring male figure who shares domestic responsibilities within the 
private sphere. However, variation patterns related to the motherhood dimen-
sion point to the persistence of a troubled relation between women’s employ-
ment and the primary roles assigned to women. Ideals of femininity still place 
motherhood in the realm of family and gender values, even though they appear 
to be moderately liberal overall. From the standpoint of ideals, the entry of men 
into traditional feminine domains gathers more agreement than the opposite 
movement. Beliefs on the centrality of family roles for women and the negative 
impact of women’s employment on children resist changes in gender relations, 
and are especially challenging to the decline of the ‘male breadwinner model’.
Scores on the motherhood dimension are significantly below average in 
post-communist countries and in Portugal, where motherhood issues seem to 
uphold conservative beliefs related to women’s roles. To a lesser extent, the 
Finns seem to share these motherhood-oriented values. In contrast, Sweden, 
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Norway, the Netherlands and Great Britain have the highest scores on this 
dimension, pointing to the acceptance of more liberal views of motherhood.
In fact, rather than settling for a simplistic hierarchical country-by-country 
classification, this bi-dimensional picture allowed me to paint a clearer attitudinal 
portrait of national differences, which suggests the need for a more careful read-
ing of the traditional-modern continuum. Even though variations in the mother-
hood dimension are greater in a cross-country perspective, attitudinal behaviour 
to the caring man dimension introduces a different perspective into this analysis.
With the exception of Sweden, Norway, the Netherlands and Switzerland, 
all of the countries have higher scores on the caring man index than on the 
motherhood dimension. However, the contrast is particularly strong in Portugal, 
Spain, France and Finland, where attitudes to men’s participation in domestic 
chores and childcare are significantly below average. The Portuguese case shows 
the greatest mix between conservatism on motherhood beliefs and liberalism 
to the caring man ideals. Post-communist countries share this contrast to some 
extent, even though they all are positioned below average on both dimensions.
GENDER DIFFERENCES: TOWARDS DIVERGENT 
CONCEPTIONS OF MASCULINITY
In this section, I discuss the results from one-way variance analysis corrob-
orating my initial hypothesis. Overall, compared to men women are more 
modern in the whole range of countries, and variance due to gender differ-
ences appears to be high (Table 2). However, gender differences are greater in 
 attitudes towards the caring man index. Gender acquires increased  explanatory 
importance for understanding interpretations of masculinity in private life. 
In contrast, motherhood and femininity ideals depend more on national 
 settings – whether they be cultural, institutional or socio-economic. The 
assumption hinted at here will be subject to country-level analysis below.
An immediate conclusion to draw from my data corroborates the view that 
women are systematically more modern than men (Figures 2 and 3). Therefore, 
the attitudinal ‘gender gap’ follows quite similar pathways across countries. A 
Figure 1: Scores on the motherhood and caring indexes by country
(Variance by country: Motherhood index – F (12.15419) = 294.37; p < 0.000, Caring man index – F (12.17121) = 
106.45; p < 0.000).
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Motherhood Caring man
Men  3.04  3.67
Women  3.23  3.91
Total  3.14  3.79
F(1.15419)=172.19; p<.000 F(1.17121)=393.72; p<.000
Table 2: Overall scores on the motherhood and the caring man indexes by gender.
Figure 2: Scores on the motherhood index by country and gender
(Variance by country: Men – F(12. 7174) = 106.92; p < 0.000; h 2 = 0.15, Women – F(12. 8247) = 194.79; 
p < 0.000; h 2 = 0.22).
Figure 3: Scores on the caring man index by country and gender
(Variance by country: Men – F(12. 8101) = 62.28; p < 0.000; h 2 = 0.09, Women – F(12. 9019) = 66.41; 
p < 0.000; h 2 = 0.08).
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 9. Regression analyses 
were not carried out for 
Slovakia, as variables 
related to the number of 
children in the household 
were not available in the 
ISSP data set.
second finding reinforces this gender pattern and points to the wider range 
of women’s positioning along the traditional-modern scale compared to men. 
While national contexts affect men’s statements less, the country-by-coun-
try variance is greater among women. However, my findings raise another 
interesting characteristic of the attitudinal gender gap across Europe. Even if 
women as an analytical group reveal more internal variance across countries, 
it is important to state that both men’s and women’s intra-group divergences 
somehow revolve around the same issue: the role of women as mothers.
FACTORS INFLUENCING ATTITUDES: THE IMPACT OF  GENDER
At this point, the findings hint at the statistical fitness of hypothesising about 
the persistent attitudinal gender gap across Europe. Let us look at the results 
from the ordinary least squares linear regression procedures applied to each 
country’s samples, and examine the weight of gender on the predictive model 
of attitudes towards motherhood and the caring man factors (Tables 3 and 4).9
In the caring man index, the regression model has low predictive capacity 
across the whole range of countries. Nevertheless, gender appears to be one of 
the most predictive coordinates. Overall, quite similar patterns can be found in 
most countries: beyond gender, attitudes to the caring man ideals are particu-
larly affected by the presence of children in the household, by stress in conciliat-
ing family with work-life (the difficulty in fulfilling family responsibilities) and 
by political positioning on the left. Age can also be a relevant factor, as in the 
case in the Netherlands where older people are more in favour of men’s domes-
tic involvement, and in France and Spain where younger people have more 
liberal views on the caring man index. Portugal is the only country in which 
education is a predictor: the longer a person is in formal education, the more 
modern their ideas will be. Switzerland, on the other hand, presents a more 
deviant pattern comparatively, because gender is not at all predictive. Left-wing 
political positioning is far more important in a country where the stay-at-home 
mother model is still predominant among couples with children.
Analyses of the motherhood index show that attitudes towards the role of 
women as mothers are predicted by a larger number of variables, and that regres-
sion models have greater predictive power. Once again – except in Portugal and 
Hungary, where age, education and family life coordinates appear to be more 
important – gender is one of the strongest predictors. However, despite the 
overall importance of gender, I should stress the increased strength of age, edu-
cational and ideological differences in predicting motherhood-related attitudes. 
Employment situation is also an important predictor, since – except in Sweden, 
where education and political ideology are better suited as predictors – the 
employed generally hold more liberal views than the unemployed. Those on the 
left and those with higher educational capitals will also be more liberal. Apart 
from some national traits, motherhood attitudes seem to depend on a larger 
number of variables, and, to a greater extent, on other forms of social  inequality 
beyond gender. Younger generations, the more educated, the employed and 
those on the left are more likely to have modern conceptions of women’s roles, 
as the cross-national findings of Inglehart and Norris (2003) show.
NATIONAL GENDER GAPS?
In this part of the analysis, I seek to buttress the hypothesis of a nation-spe-
cific gender gap in values, as discussed above. With the goal of classifying 
the countries according to their similarities, I aggregated the 13 countries and 
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carried out a Ward’s hierarchical cluster analysis based on the two indexes, 
considering men’s and women’s scores separately as well as the average 
differences between them. This procedure allowed me to divide the countries 
analysed here into five groups. In effect, I found that the five-cluster solution 
best fitted in terms of balance between within-cluster homogeneity and clarity 
in portraying different types of gender arrangements across Europe (Table 5). 
According to my observations, there are in fact multiple ‘gender gaps’.
The first cluster brings together western Germany, Great Britain, Switzerland 
and the Netherlands, where the male breadwinner arrangement is still 
strong (Pfau-Effinger 2004), around a narrow attitudinal gender gap pattern. 
Nevertheless, disagreement between men and women revolves more around 
the motherhood dimension than the man’s role in domestic life. Norway, 
Sweden and Finland, where the dual earner/dual carer arrangement has been 
promoted, follow this pattern, but significantly enlarging both the gender gap 
and the degree of attitudinal liberalism. Scores on the caring man dimension are 
also higher and slightly more affected by gender differentiation. Another cluster 
gathers post-communist countries, which are the most conservative. Gender 
roles and identities fit into a traditional framework, despite the fact that women 
would appreciate men taking more responsibility for housework and child-
care. Here the larger gender gap relates to the caring man dimension. Portugal 
also presents a specific pattern, for although conservatism in the motherhood 
dimension is shared, Portuguese men are more strongly in favour of a mascu-
line domestic role than are men in the previous cluster. In the case of Spain and 
France, my final country-group, the findings point to a double-pattern gender 
gap, revealing some level of normative divergence on both dimensions.
Motherhood index Caring man index
Total Men Women Difference 
M−F
Total Men Women Difference 
M−F
Western Germany,
Great Britain,
the Netherlands 
and Switzerland
3.33 3.22 3.42 −0.21 3.59 3.52 3.66 −0.14
Norway,
Sweden and
Finland
3.69 3.52 3.82 −0.30 3.75 3.64 3.84 −0.21
Hungary,
Poland and
Slovakia
2.57 2.56 2.59 −0.03 3.66 3.42 3.88 −0.46
Portugal 2.60 2.59 2.62 −0.03 4.11 3.97 4.24 −0.27
Spain and
France
3.15 3.03 3.26 −0.23 3.98 3.87 4.09 −0.21
Total 3.14 3.04 3.23 −0.19 3.79 3.67 3.91 −0.24
Table 5: Ward’s hierarchical cluster analysis based on the two indexes, considering men’s average, women’s 
average and difference M−F.
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The gender gap patterns follow a broad distinction: whether disagreement 
privileges the motherhood or the caring man dimension. Table 6 shows the 
correlation between attitudes and the country-level variables, and presents 
two important connections.
The first connection is that higher levels of women’s empowerment (in edu-
cation, political participation and income), as well as increased proportions of 
divorce, cohabitation, extra-marital births and people living alone, are associated 
with both greater country liberalism and a larger gender gap on the motherhood 
dimension. The second connection is that higher national proportions of moth-
ers (with children under 12 years) in full-time paid labour connect with higher 
scores on the caring man factor and, inversely, lower women’s employment, and, 
interestingly, part-time employed mothers associate with liberalism towards 
motherhood issues. Furthermore, the more women are in full-time paid work 
the greater the gender differences in attitudes to the caring man dimension. In 
sum, while a mother’s employment seems to be associated with the approval of 
men’s participation in domestic tasks and childcare, all other factors concerning 
gender achievements correlate with more liberal views of women and mother-
hood. How should we interpret these findings?
High levels of ‘women’s empowerment’, indicating fairness in education, 
income or politics, and modern forms of family organisation seem to uphold lib-
eral beliefs concerning motherhood, and are more important to gender differentia-
tion in attitudes. However, attitudinal consensus towards the caring man ideal is 
also stronger, and men’s domestic involvement is not so enhanced. Interestingly, 
visions of femininity are less conservative and ideals of a woman-individual more 
widespread, but without connecting to mothers’ full-time employment, which sug-
gests that conceptions of women’s independence might not necessarily be linked 
to a dual-earner family model in the child-rearing phase. Let us recall, for instance, 
that western Germany, Switzerland and the Netherlands are all countries in which 
mother-oriented policies are combined with mothers’ part-time work or staying at 
home (Blossfeld and Drobnic 2001). However, other forms of emancipation, which 
are not necessarily connected to financial autonomy, are also important.
In Norway and Sweden the pattern is similar on the subject of mother-
hood. However, the fact that women are working full time in higher propor-
tions may be linked to a wider gender gap on the caring man dimension. 
Baxter and Kane (1995) have argued that in countries in which women have 
more equal opportunities (in achieving autonomy through paid work, for 
instance) the gender gap tends to be greater because this contributes to wom-
en’s awareness of inequalities. In less equalitarian countries, the gender gap 
may be smaller because women share men’s dominant point of view.
However, gender relations and attitudes appear to be a bit more complex. 
Lower levels of gender fairness in education or politics and a more family-ori-
ented organisation of family life (with a greater number of married couples with 
children, for example) and, generally, more recent processes of  modernisation 
and democratisation, as is the case of post-communist countries, or to a lesser 
extent of Portugal, do not erase the gender gap. Modern views of femininity 
may not have been promoted as strongly, but if women are in full-time paid 
work, they are apparently more likely to highlight men’s domestic involvement, 
thus defying traditional divisions of labour and masculinity. Even if family-
oriented values are important and there is a strong concentration on children 
and motherhood, the ideals of men as companions and involved fathers – the 
opposite of the traditional absent figure of men as breadwinners – are becom-
ing much more common, for instance in Portugal (Wall et al 2007).
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CONCLUDING REMARKS
I have argued that gender plays a key role in shaping attitudes to men’s and 
women’s ideal roles and identities within the family. Rather than erasing the 
gender gap in attitudes and generating consensus on equality, modernisation 
has contributed to shaping and changing gender differentiation in values. The 
more liberal view women hold across European societies has been proved to 
have an impact on the patterns of attitudes towards gender roles and fam-
ily values. A greater intra-group variation among European women, when 
compared to men’s higher internal homogeneity, also reveals the extent to 
which women’s attitudinal behaviour is important in understanding differ-
ences between men and women. However, gender gaps are also moulded by 
national variations and the ways in which a country’s values reflect specific 
gender regimes in family life. Rather than the idea of a one-dimensional move 
from tradition to modernity, which would generate attitudinal consensus, my 
findings have shown a considerable amount of inter-country diversity.
Although exploratory factor analysis and congruence tests have revealed 
two dimensions well suited to cross-national comparison – the motherhood 
and the caring man factors – national differences have arisen. Generally, 
Europeans are fairly modern in their views; however, while the tension between 
independence and the primary responsibilities of motherhood still troubles 
the ideal roles of women, the caring male figure who shares domestic respon-
sibilities and childcare has increased in popularity. Femininity is still closely 
connected to motherhood, and the negative impact of employment on small 
children is often viewed as affecting women’s entitlement to paid work and 
public life. The decline in traditional conceptions of masculinity and of men as 
the sole providers is not necessarily linked to the emphasis on women’s inde-
pendence. However, it is interesting that today both women and men are being 
drawn into the private sphere. Motherhood as a value is at the core of gender 
ideologies, but ideals of masculinity are also placing men in family life.
At the country level, I showed that the gender gap is path-specific, and 
identified broad lines of cross-national differentiation. Countries seem to group 
together according to whether disagreement focuses on the motherhood or the 
caring man dimension, or both at the same time. Several countries, from the 
Scandinavian and central European to Great Britain, have more liberal scores on 
the motherhood dimension, which is also the most affected by gender disagree-
ment. However, quite a few countries enhance men’s participation in the pri-
vate sphere while combining these liberal views with more conservative views 
concerning motherhood. This is the case of Finland, Spain and France, where 
gender disagreement is important on both dimensions. Portugal presents the 
most extreme pattern due to the acute oscillation between the ‘traditional moth-
er-woman’ and the ‘caring man’. However, gender differences relate mainly to 
the masculine dimension, whereas there is gender consensus towards mother-
hood. Post-communist countries have a conservative version of this profile, thus 
revealing a much wider gender gap on the caring man dimension. In this group 
of countries, men have a much more conservative vision of their own ideal role 
than women do. In sum, the analysis leads me to stress the close connection 
between the traditional and the modern, and the binary structure of the attitu-
dinal gender gap that centres on either the feminine or the masculine roles.
The gender gap relating to the motherhood index is linked to certain forms 
of gender equality and to the deinstitutionalisation of family life, while the gap 
relating to the caring man dimension depends more strongly on the impact of 
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women’s full-time employment, especially the full-time employment of moth-
ers. These findings bring complexity to the women’s independence hypothesis. 
On the one hand, independence due to full-time employment promotes the 
questioning of traditional masculinity and of the ‘male breadwinner model’, 
while on the other, liberal attitudes towards ideals of womanhood seems to 
depend more on modernisation and overall gender empowerment. In the 
end, we may ask what women’s independence is about.
One element is the societal level of overall gender fairness; another is finan-
cial independence. The former may emerge even in the context of family policies 
that are more centred on state support for stay-at-home or half-earner mothers 
and the refusal of the dual breadwinner model. However, the absence of gender 
equality in employment does not draw men into the private sphere as strongly 
at the level of attitudes. On the other hand, the idea that equality and modern 
views of the family and gender relations can simply be anticipated because of 
the increase in women’s employment hardly fits my findings. Women’s full-time 
employment has a powerful effect on the caring man dimension, but, interest-
ingly, fails to promote liberal conceptions of women and motherhood, for which 
overall modernisation seems necessary. The links among modernisation, changes 
in employment patterns, gender systems and equality values are quite complex, 
meaning that it is necessary to examine gender inequalities within each country’s 
historical, economical and socio-cultural particularities.
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APPENDICES
Independent variables Codes
Sex 1 – men 2 – women
Age 15 – 18 96
Marital status 1 – married/cohabiting 2 – not married
Number of years education 0 – no formal schooling 30 years
Political positioning 1 – left 10 – right
Church attendance 1 – Several times a week 8 – never
Number of children aged under 5/6 
years in the household
0 4 or more
Number of children between 6 and 
17 years in the household
0 4 or more
Employment status
1 – full-time, 2 – part-time, 3 – < part-time, 4 – not at
                            work
Weekly working hours 0 96
Difficulty in fulfilling family 
responsibilities
1 – Several times a week 4 – never/n.a.
Difficulty in concentrating at work 1 – Several times a week 4 – never/n.a.
Appendix 1: Description of codes of variables. 
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Years of schooling, 
(women over 14)a
Employment rate of 
women aged 15–64b
Women 20–49 with 
children under 12 
years in full-time 
employment (%)c
Women 20–49 with 
children under 12 
years in part-time 
employment (%)c
Women legislators, 
senior officials and 
managers (%)d
Women professional 
and technical 
workers (%)d
Seats in parliament 
held by women (%)d
Ratio of estimated 
women’s to men’s 
earned incomed
Divorce ratee
Births out of marriage 
(%)e
Couple with children
(% of households)f
Lone mother
(% of households)f
Single person
(% households)b
Cohabiting couples
(% households)b
G
er
m
an
y
9.
69
58
.9
24
.9
35
.1
30
.5
35
50
0.
58
2.
60
28
.0
0
26
.5
5.
0
35
.8
0
G
re
at
 B
ri
ta
in
9.
39
65
.2
25
.6
36
.2
18
.5
33
46
0.
65
2.
80
42
.3
0
27
.2
8.
5
30
.2
0
Th
e 
N
et
he
rl
an
ds
9.
12
66
.2
14
.9
54
.7
34
.2
26
48
0.
63
1.
90
32
.5
0
30
.4
4.
9
33
.6
0
Sw
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la
nd
9.
92
71
.5
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.0
0
37
.0
24
.8
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46
0.
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0
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.0
0
H
un
ga
ry
8.
70
49
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40
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